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ABSTRACT 
The paper critically examines the New Keynesian explanation of hysteresis based on the role of 
long-term unemployment. We first examine its analytical foundations, according to which rehiring 
long-term unemployed individuals would not be possible without accelerating inflation. Then we 
empirically assess its validity along two lines of inquiry. First, we investigate the reversibility of 
long-term unemployment. Then we focus on episodes of sustained long-term unemployment 
reductions to check for inflationary effects. Specifically, in a panel of 25 OECD countries (from 
1983 to 2016), we verify by means of local projections whether they are associated with 
inflationary pressures in a subsequent five-year window. Two main results emerge: i) the evolution 
of the long-term unemployment rate is almost completely synchronous with the dynamics of the 
total unemployment rate, both during downswings and upswings; ii) we do not find indications of 
accelerating or persistently higher inflation during and after episodes of strong declines in the long-
term unemployment rate, even when they occur in country-years in which the actual 
unemployment rate was estimated to be below a conventionally estimated Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). Our results call into question the role of long-term 
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unemployment in causing hysteresis and provide support to policy implications that are at variance 
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“There is no sign that the pool of supposedly less employable long-term unemployed people, 
which has so preoccupied economists and governments, ever existed” 
(Webster, 2005) 
 
“We have not yet seen clear indications that the short-term unemployed are finding it 
increasingly easier to find work relative to the long-term unemployed” 
(Yellen, 2014) 
 
1. Introduction and background 
The post-Great Financial Crisis period has featured, particularly in Europe, persistently higher 
levels of unemployment, as well as lower growth rates and an estimated potential path far below 
its pre-crisis trend. Many authors have regarded these developments as not independent of the 
recession. Such prolonged effects in terms of economic activity and increased unemployment, 
however, are in contrast with standard macroeconomic models, according to which Central banks 
can continually keep the economy close to its potential level by means of interest rate management. 
This newer thinking has two weighty implications. First it casts severe doubt on the legitimacy of 
New Consensus macroeconomics, whose main feature is confidence in monetary policy’s ability 
to reduce output volatility and ensure stable and lasting growth in capitalist economies 
(Goodfriend, 2007). It also favors the revival of the theme of hysteresis, both in the unemployment 
rate and output level (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Ball, 2014; Blanchard et al., 2015; 
Blanchard, 2018; Girardi et al., 2020).1 Hysteresis is generally meant to imply that by increasing 
the actual unemployment rate significantly, a deep recession may also cause a change in the 
equilibrium unemployment rate or the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
(NAIRU) and, consequently, in potential output. In essence, this approach admits the possibility 
that a cyclical fall in economic activity may have persistent effects on macroeconomic outcomes. 
In addition to persistently higher unemployment rates, what animated the rediscovery of hysteresis 
was the absence of the deflationary pressure that standard macroeconomic models would have 
required to restore the pre-crisis equilibrium: this phenomenon has been termed missing deflation, 
and it further testifies to a puzzle concerning the unemployment-inflation link (Yellen, 2014). 
Hysteresis, and in particular the missing deflation side of the tale, has been explained in connection 
with the presumed worsening of long-term unemployment. It is within this line of inquiry that we 
wish to situate our paper, and we particularly aim at assessing this explanation at the empirical 
level. According to the just-mentioned interpretation of hysteresis, higher levels of the NAIRU 
resulting from an increase in long-term unemployment would boost the inflationary risk of 
expansionary policies. Such a higher risk would depend on the fact that labor demand would 
primarily involve short-term unemployed individuals who would be able to bargain for substantial 
 
1 The New Consensus developed during the so-called period of Great Moderation, that is, between 1985 and the Great 
Recession. In that context, the concept of hysteresis was almost totally neglected by academic research. As Blanchard 
(2018) has pointed out, over time, as the so-called Great Moderation took place from the mid-1980s up to about 2007, 
research on hysteresis largely disappeared (p. 98). 
wage increases, owing to the inability of the long-term unemployed to actually compete for the 
jobs. Indeed, according to this literature, all long-term unemployed people can be regarded as bad 
inflation fighters. This, it is claimed, depends on the fact that they suffer from skill deterioration 
and/or detachment from the labor market, two conditions that would relegate them outside the 
realm of wage negotiations and thus make them non-competitors with regard to the other workers. 
As a consequence, their status is considered hardly reversible without engendering sizeable 
inflationary pressures. Thus, we have on one side an expansionary policy aimed at reabsorbing 
unemployment that would hardly be effective in reducing its long-term component; on the other 
side, the presence of a relatively large pool of long-term unemployed individuals would make 
overall unemployment less effective in weakening wage inflation, thus providing an explanation 
for the missing deflation. It is clear that crucial in this line of reasoning is the assumption of 
asymmetry between total and long-term unemployment. In fact, this interpretation of hysteresis 
would predict that when total unemployment falls (i.e., during phases of economic recovery), its 
long-term component would not fall in the same proportion. In turn, this implies that attempts to 
reduce long-term unemployment by means of expansionary policies, even if successful, would 
require paying a price in terms of higher or accelerating inflation rates. 
Starting from this, we put under empirical scrutiny the validity of the New Keynesian (NK) 
assumption of irreversibility of long-term unemployment. Predominantly, we do so by 
investigating the evolution of long-term unemployment and aggregate unemployment in a panel 
of 25 mature OECD countries to verify whether irreversibility is supported at the empirical level. 
Secondly, we present an econometric analysis aimed at verifying whether inflationary surges are 
likely to occur during and after episodes of strong reduction of the long-term unemployment rate 
and in a subset of such episodes when, according to official estimates, the unemployment rate was 
already below the conventionally accepted NAIRU. To do so, we employ local projections, as 
initially introduced in Jordà (2005) and recently used in Girardi et al. (2020), to assess the dynamic 
impact in terms of inflation of 78 (58 in the subset) cases of sharp, long-term unemployment 
reductions that occurred between 1983 and 2016. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present in some detail the NK explanation of 
hysteresis caused by long-term unemployment. Section 3 deals with the inquiry regarding the relationship 
between long-term and overall unemployment. In Section 4, we focus on the effects in terms of inflation of 
sustained reductions in the long-term unemployment rate. Section 5 concludes and draws some implications 
for the current policy debates on unemployment and hysteresis. 
 
2. The role of long-term unemployment in New Keynesian models 
 
2.1 Long-term unemployed as detached from the labor market and bad inflation fighters 
Three main explanations for hysteresis can be found in the literature.2 The first focuses on the 
interaction of labor market institutions and shocks in causing unemployment persistence and relies 
on insider-outsider models (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1986). The 
second focuses on the impact of aggregate demand on capital formation, and it is based on the 
negative effects of reduced investment on capital stock and productivity (Haltmaier, 2012; Gordon, 
1995; Rowthorn, 1995, 1999). The third one dwells on the role of the long-term unemployed. In 
 
2 For a more exhaustive review, see Girardi et al. (2020). 
this paper, we focus on the latter, which with a certain degree of generality can be summarized as 
follows. The NK explanation of hysteresis postulates that long-term unemployed individuals lose 
employability and detach from the labor force. As a result, they cease to exert downward pressure 
on wages, to the point that they are considered ‘bad inflation fighters’ and responsible for the 
‘missing deflation’. Hence, a larger pool of long-term unemployed people would lead to an 
increase in the NAIRU (Rusticelli, 2015; Mathy, 2016), and therefore to a decline in potential 
output.3 
 
According to the existing literature, the long-term unemployed would have fewer chances of being 
reemployed than the short-term unemployed – and then would not contribute to pushing down 
inflation – for reasons involving both labor demand and labor supply. Usually, the socio-economic 
literature identifies this phenomenon with the term duration (or state) dependence. The intuition 
behind this is rather simple: the longer the duration of unemployment, the lower the probability of 
being rehired (Layard et al., 1991; Bean, 1994; Blanchard and Diamond, 1994; Dosi et al., 2016). 
From the supply side, the duration of unemployment would be positively associated with 
discouragement in job searching (Phelps, 1972; Heap, 1980; Johansen, 1982; Devine and Kiefer, 
1991; Schmitt and Wadsworth, 1993; Bean, 1994; Krueger and Mueller, 2012) and with the 
depreciation of human capital (Pissarides, 1992; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998). It has also been 
argued that a lower effort in job searching may depend on unemployment benefits (Ljungqvist and 
Sargent, 1998; Bassanini and Duval, 2006) and that detachment from the labor market would be 
higher in cases where they are notably generous (Guichard and Rusticelli, 2010). It should be 
noted, however, that in order to determine an increase in the NAIRU, discouraged and 
marginalized workers should not completely leave the labor market but remain unemployed, that 
is, actively seeking jobs; in the event that discouragement pushes them to leave the labor force, the 
NAIRU would actually decrease. 
 
From the demand-side, employers are said to discriminate among candidates depending on the 
duration of their status of unemployment (Acemoglu, 1995): specifically, businesses would be able 
to rank job applications based on the spell of unemployment (Lockwood, 1991; Blanchard and 
Diamond, 1994) and would be less willing to hire long-term unemployed people (Ghayad, 2013; 
Kroft et al., 2016).4 This reluctance is called the stigma effect, and it would exist as long as 
employers believe that long-term unemployed individuals are characterized by lower productivity 
than short-term unemployed individuals (Røed, 1997; Abraham et al., 2016). In turn, according to 
some contributions, this would depend on the fact that a longer time in unemployment signals the 
existence of individual characteristics that make them scarcely employable (unobservable 
 
3 The concept of NAIRU has been criticized along different lines by a variety of works belonging to the broadly 
defined post-Keynesian tradition. Among these, the reader can refer to Arestis and Sawyer (2005), Storm and 
Naastepad (2007) and Lang and Setterfield (2020). Stockhammer (2008) traces a series of specific characteristics of 
the NAIRU and evaluates them in alternative theoretical frameworks. A recent policy brief by Blanchard (2016), based 
on an earlier paper (Blanchard et al., 2015), raised a number of interesting points concerning the NAIRU and the 
Phillips Curve. A partial reconsideration of the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment also emerges in Blanchard (2018). 
4 In this regard, some authors attributed the shift to the right of the Beveridge curve to the role of long-term 
unemployment (Bouvet, 2012; Ghayad and Dickens, 2012). Other works have criticized this view along different lines 
of inquiry (Elsby et al., 2010; Diamond and Şahin, 2015; Mathy, 2016). 
heterogeneity), so that some scholars have labeled them as bad apples (Imbens and Lynch, 2006; 
Kroft et al., 2016). 
 
Although both explanations are currently subject to debate and not wholly supported by evidence,5 
the explanation of hysteresis relies on the assumption that long-term unemployed people are on 
the margins of the labor force, and therefore they are considered as exerting feeble (downward) 
pressure on wage dynamics (Ball, 1999; Krueger et al., 2014). Accordingly, an increase in the pool 
of long-term unemployed would not weaken the wage claims by the ‘insiders’. 
 
In this respect, the work by Llaudes (2005) is rather clear. In his words, ‘long-term unemployed, 
as outsiders, have little influence on the wage bargaining process, while the insiders, the employed 
or newly unemployed, have the ability to impose their wage aspirations’ (p. 11). This view, too, 
has been questioned at the empirical level (Speigner, 2014). However, it is still at the core of the 
standard NK formalization of hysteresis based on the role of the long-term unemployed. 
 
2.2 Long-term unemployment and hysteresis in the 3-equation model 
To understand how the NK approach formally incorporates the possibility of hysteresis in the labor 
market, let us refer to a standard macroeconomic textbook presentation (cf. Carlin and Soskice, 
2006, 2014). According to this, central banks manage the policy interest rate to constantly keep 
the economy close to its potential level.6 This also implies equilibrium in the labor market: by 
affecting the level of activity, the monetary policy aims at closing the unemployment gap, that is, 
the difference between the actual and the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment or the NAIRU. As in the 
short run, due to the existence of wage and price rigidities, an exogenous shock in aggregate 
demand may affect both output and employment, the actual unemployment rate may deviate from 
the NAIRU, and consequently, the inflation rate would start to change. Therefore, the Central bank 
would intervene by adjusting the policy interest rate in order to achieve its inflation target.7 
Generally, inflation falls when there is slack in the labor market (that is, a positive unemployment 
gap) and grows when the labor market is tight (a negative unemployment gap). Accordingly, in 
the medium to long run, this framework is compatible with a vertical Phillips curve (Blanchard, 
2016). 
 
5 Some criticisms have been advanced on different grounds, to the point that some very influential scholars have 
partially revised their perception of the role of the long-term unemployed (Blanchard, 2006; Blanchard and Katz, 
1997). For instance, even supporting the notion that time out of work leads to skill decay, Edin and Gustavsson (2008) 
do not disregard the possibility of reverse causation (that is, whether negative trends in skills lead to unemployment). 
Moreover, a variety of works have criticized the role of unemployment benefits in affecting labor market outcomes 
(Baker et al., 2005; Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Stockhammer and Sturn, 2012; Aleksynska, 2014; Boone et al., 
2016). 
6 A clarification is needed here. Within the NK framework, potential output is defined as the maximum level of output 
achievable with the maximum utilization of production factors (generally, labor and capital) consistent with existing 
market imperfections and a stable inflation rate. Potential GDP is essential in policy making because Central banks 
use the difference between actual and potential GDP (i.e., the output gap) to determine whether the economy needs 
more or less monetary stimulus. 
7 In this respect, the following quote by Carlin and Soskice (2014) is quite evocative: ‘What is the central bank trying 
to achieve? It is assumed that its aim is to use monetary policy to stabilize the economy, which means keeping the 
economy close to equilibrium output and keeping inflation close to its targeted rate’ (p. 89). 
Technically, the monetary authority makes use of a monetary policy rule, an equation describing 
the behavior of the Central bank in terms of the output gap (or equivalently in terms of the 
unemployment gap) and the deviation of the actual inflation rate from its target.8 In this way, 
monetary authorities operate to preserve the economy around its potential level and keep the pace 
of inflation constant. We can see it in the so-called 3-equation model (Carlin and Soskice, 2006, 
2014), which includes: 
i) a standard IS curve (Equation 1) representing the demand side of the economy, in which 
output ( ) is a positive function of autonomous expenditure ( ) and a negative function of the 
real interest rate ( ); 
ii) an accelerationist Phillips curve (Equation 2), representing the supply side of the economy, 
where the actual inflation rate is a function of the output gap ; explicitly, only when the 
output gap is closed, the actual inflation rate ( ) is equal to the expected inflation rate ( );  
iii) a monetary policy rule (Equation 3), representing the behavior of the Central bank; here, 
the output gap relates to the deviation between the actual inflation rate and its target , and the 
parameter  indicates to what extent the Central bank is inflation-adverse.9 
 
          (1) 
        (2) 
        (3) 
To capture the role of hysteresis in increasing the inflationary risk of an expansionary policy, we 
combine the above-sketched 3-equation model with a standard NK model of the labor market. 
Instead of the neoclassical model which considers labor demand and labor supply curves, the NK 
model of the labor market includes a price-setting curve ( ) and a wage-setting curve ( ). The 
two curves represent the behavior of employers and workers, respectively, in a non-competitive 
labor market (Carlin and Soskice, 2014; Blanchard, 2017). 
On the one side, the  curve represents the level of real wages, expressed as the ratio between 
nominal wage ( ) and expected prices ( ) desired by the employees. Here, the real wage is 
positively related to total employment ( ) and its intercept is determined by a parameter ( ).10 The 
latter represents all the wage push factors able to increase the bargaining power of workers (e.g., 
labor market institutions, unemployment benefits and trade union influence) and, in this sense, 
they are viewed as market stickiness. According to the formalization provided by literature (Layard 
 
8 The best-known approach is the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), a guideline for Central banks in setting the policy interest 
rate to achieve an equilibrium real interest rate. For a deeper discussion on the behavior of the monetary authority, 
see, among others, Blinder (2000), Taylor (2000), Setterfield (2004) and Carlin and Soskice (2006). For a critical view 
of the estimates of the equilibrium (natural) rate of interest and the stance of monetary policy, see Levrero (2019). 
9 More precisely, the higher the aversion to inflation, the higher the loss of output and employment that the Central 
bank will be willing to accept in order to avoid inflation surges. 
10 Unlike the formulation by Carlin and Soskice (2014) adopted here, in Blanchard (2017), the  schedule is 
downward-shaped as it considers unemployment instead of employment. However, this does not affect the general 
line of reasoning as for a given labor force, unemployment is the difference between active population and 
employment. 
et al., 1991; Carlin and Soskice, 2014), the parameter , together with the aforementioned 
institutions operating in favor of workers, also captures the role of long-term unemployment in 
wage-setting. The reason behind this interpretation is consistent with the NK explanation of 
hysteresis: the effect of long-term unemployment on the wage-setting curve is analogous to the 
role played by pro-worker labor market institutions.11 
On the other side, the  curve represents the real wage determined by the price-setting rule 
followed by enterprises. As is standard in macroeconomics textbooks (Carlin and Soskice, 2014; 
Blanchard, 2017), for the sake of simplicity, we assume a flat  schedule. 
As far as the formalization of the model is concerned, Equation (4) indicates how workers set their 
request for nominal wage on the basis of an expected level of prices. In parallel, Equation 5 shows 
how enterprises set prices, and hence the actual real wage, by adding a fixed mark-up ( ) to a 
given labor productivity ( ). Only when the labor market is in equilibrium (i.e., only when the 
actual unemployment rate is equal to the NAIRU), the actual real wage set by employers ( ) is 
the same desired by workers ( ), and the expected and actual price levels coincide. 
          (4) 
          (5). 
This toolbox helps us to understand how hysteresis works within a NK macroeconomic model and, 
more importantly, what its implications are for the dynamics of the inflation rate. A complete 
picture is provided in Figure 1, which combines three graphs: the upper one is the IS curve; in the 
middle, we find the Phillips curve ( ) and the monetary rule ( ); and the lower graph represents 
the -  labor market. Starting from a general equilibrium (both in goods and in labor markets) 
depicted by point , let us suppose that an unexpected increase in autonomous consumption (i.e., 
an increase in ) will shift the IS curve to the right (from  to ). For the same real interest 
rate ( ), the economy will move from  to , a situation in which income ( ), employment (  
and the inflation rate (  are higher than their equilibrium values ( ,  and , respectively). 
 
Moreover, we see that is not on the  curve: with  higher than , the short-run  will 
shift up. In this situation, if the Central bank wants to bring the system back towards its initial 
equilibrium ( ), it has to implement a restrictive policy by increasing the monetary interest rate. 
After the monetary tightening, the economy will move from  to , a point that lies on the , 
where income is  and where the inflation rate is lower than . Accordingly, the short-run 
 will also shift down. The attempt by the Central bank to dampen the inflation rate below  
would require the actual income to drop below its potential level ( ). What happens after this 
drop would depend on the presence or absence of hysteresis. 
  
 
11 As explained in Section 2.1, a higher pool of long-term unemployed people will reinforce the power of workers 
involved in the wage negations, inasmuch as they are less employable and, therefore, they will not depress wage 
inflation (non-inflationary fighters). This recalls the functioning of the insider-outsider models, as already discussed 
with reference to Llaudes (2005, p. 11). 

If hysteresis is not at work, the short-run Phillips curve will progressively shift down until it  
reaches its initial position: accordingly, the economy will converge to the initial equilibrium (  ). 
If hysteresis is at work, the greater the Central bank-induced recession, the more long-term 
unemployment will increase, and the more significant the increase in the NAIRU. Indeed, once 
long-term unemployment increases, the  curve will shift up (from  to ), and a new 
equilibrium will be determined. Putting it differently, the economic system starts moving from  
to : nevertheless, due to hysteresis, the adjustment stops at , that is, in a new equilibrium with 
a higher unemployment rate – which in the graph is represented by lower employment ( ) 
– and a lower potential output ( ). Thus, the unemployment gap is smaller than in the case 
without hysteresis, owing to the upward shift of the NAIRU that moves it closer to the actual 
unemployment rate.12 As a result, the threat of inflationary consequences of expansive demand-
side policy increases. The inflationary risk is higher as the increased labor demand resulting from 
an expansion would primarily be addressed to the short-term unemployed. The latter (as the 
insiders in insider-outsider models) are the only fraction of the unemployed that has a role in wage 
negotiations, and this is likely to cause accelerating inflation (Llaudes, 2005, p. 11). According to 
this model, therefore, accelerating inflation is a necessary result of demand-side policies 
implemented to fight unemployment as a whole, including its long-term component.13 
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, with these models we face an asymmetry: the presence 
of a sizeable pool of long-term unemployed people would not weaken wage inflation following a 
recession, and at the same time, an expansionary policy aimed at reabsorbing unemployment as a 
whole would push it up. But this looks like a blind alley for full employment policies and motivates 
us to further investigate at the empirical level the relationships between total unemployment, long-
term unemployment and inflation. 
3. Unemployment and its long-term component: an explorative inquiry 
In the class of models described in the previous section, the increase in long-term unemployment 
generally experienced after a recession would cause an increase in the NAIRU. Accordingly, the 
inflationary potential of demand-side expansionary policies aimed at recovering earlier output and 
unemployment would be high. To inquire in this line of reasoning, we should prima facie 
investigate whether higher long-term unemployment tends to persist during phases of economic 
recovery (i.e., when the total unemployment falls). Secondly, we should verify if, as predicted by 
the models, accelerating inflation would take place in a context of decreasing long-term 
unemployment, and particularly so if the economy features a null or negative unemployment gap. 
This section deals with the first step of the empirical analysis, as after looking at some explorative 
 
12 As noted in Martin et al. (2015), after the Great Recession, there is no sign of convergence of the actual 
unemployment rate (or actual income) towards the NAIRU (or potential output). On the contrary, they argue that ‘in 
contrast to the typical assumption that output grows rapidly after recessions to close the output gap, the gap is also 
closed through revisions to potential output’ (p. 11). 
13 Very clearly, Rudebusch and Williams (2014) state: ‘When the short-term unemployment share was at a historic 
low, the optimal monetary policy would allow inflation to rise well above levels implied by the standard model and 
indeed to overshoot the inflation target for a time’ (p. 6). 
evidence we delve deeper into the relationship between long-term unemployment and total 
unemployment. 
The prediction of the hysteresis models under scrutiny is that on the one hand, when total 
unemployment falls, long-term unemployed people tend to remain in their status of unemployed. 
This implies a minor role of long-term unemployed people in wage-setting, to the point that if their 
weight is sizeable, a lower-than-necessary (to reduce unemployment) decrease in the real wage 
would be observed. In other words, the sacrifice in terms of persistent unemployment to achieve a 
stable inflation rate would be higher. Quite evocative, in this respect, is the statement by Machin 
and Manning (1999) that ‘long-term unemployment has been argued to be a cause of high 
unemployment itself’ (p. 3087). 
Such a view is crucially grounded on the assumption that an asymmetrical relationship between 
total unemployment and long-term unemployment holds. Some works, to which we will refer 
below, have already cast unsettling light on this hypothesis. However, before we move to this, 
some discussion is needed about how best to measure long-term unemployment and its relationship 
to total unemployment. In the literature, two different measures are alternatively used to assess the 
magnitude of long-term unemployment: the long-term unemployment rate, that is, the ratio 
between the long-term unemployed and the labor force; and the incidence of long-term 
unemployment, that is, the ratio between the long-term unemployed and the total unemployed.14 
While they share the same numerator, a crucial difference between the two measures relies on their 
denominator. 
It has been argued (Webster, 2005) that using the unemployment incidence can give rise to 
spurious results owing to the relatively high variability of the short-term unemployment 
component of unemployment, which may reflect labor market regulation (i.e., the incidence of 
short-term labor contracts), seasonal factors and cyclical phases. Concerning the latter, for 
example, an empirical regularity is that at the onset of a recession, the inflow of newly unemployed 
people increases the short-term component of unemployment and hence reduces long-term 
unemployment incidence; subsequently, as high unemployment persists, the incidence of long-
term unemployment increases. At the beginning of a recovery, on the other hand, long-term 
unemployment incidence tends to increase since the short-term component of unemployment tends 
to fall, partly because of exits towards employment and partly since, with time, people still 
unemployed become long-term unemployed, while the ‘new’ inflows in unemployment shrink due 
to the economic recovery. Having considered this, we opt for using the long-term unemployment 
rate ( ) as our preferred measure,15 as defined in Equation (6), where  identifies the 
pool of long-term unemployed and  is the labor force: 
          (6). 
It is important to remember that the seminal work by Layard et al. (1991) supported the non-
symmetrical relationship between total and long-term unemployment by looking at the long-term 
 
14 Further details on variables’ definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
15 To be fair, the limitation of long-term unemployment incidence in applied analysis may be mitigated by using the 
correct structure of time lags. In fact, when correctly considering the latter, the relationship between the incidence of 
 
unemployment incidence. According to Webster (2005), however, when comparing the evolution 
of the incidence of long-term unemployment with the total unemployment rate, one may fall into 
the so-called long-term unemployment trap (p. 980), that is, one may misinterpret the above 
described increase in long-term unemployment incidence at the beginning of the recovery as a 
confirmation of the presence of hysteresis. As a consequence, demand expansions would appear 
unable to reduce long-term unemployment, and only supply-side policies aimed at reducing labor 
market rigidities would be successful (Rusticelli, 2015, p. 115).16 Making use of the long-term 
unemployment rate has therefore the important advantage for the applied analysis that the labor 
force is less volatile than unemployment.17 In line with the literature, we will identify the long-
term unemployed as individuals who have been unemployed for at least six months, as was 
assumed in most empirical studies and surveys (among which are Elsby et al., 2010; Abraham et 
al., 2016). 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the unemployment rate ( ) and the long-term 
unemployment rate ( ) from the 1980s to recent times. Specifically, we refer to the 
average values of total and long-term unemployment rates with respect to 25 OECD countries 
between 1983 and 2016. Upon visual inspection, there is no sizeable increase in the : in 
2016, it was still comparable to its initial level of 1983 (about 4.2% and 4%, respectively). More 
importantly, the  has tracked down in relation to the  in almost exactly the same 
way that it tracked up. In OECD countries, the  peaked at 5.4% in 2013, not much higher 
than its value in 1994 when it peaked at 5.2%. Accordingly, the observation that ‘there is no sign 
that the pool of supposedly less employable long-term unemployed people, which has so 
preoccupied economists and governments, ever existed’ (Webster, 2005, p. 978) seems to still be 




long-term unemployment and the total unemployment rate turns out to be a ‘normal relationship’, that is, a symmetric 
one (Webster, 2005, p. 985). In this respect, some exploratory evidence for OECD countries indicates that the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and its incidence is stronger and presents less dispersion when using the 
lagged rate of unemployment instead of the current (see Figures A2.1 and A2.2 in Appendix 2). Importantly, the issue 
of time lags has also been mentioned in Bean (1994), who labeled the attitude of empirical literature in analyzing the 
European (long-term) unemployment patterns as ‘cavalier’. Note that the long-term unemployment data comes from 
the OECD labor force statistics and are only available at the annual frequency: this may limit the identification of the 
appropriate time lag to be used. 
16 By contrast, a variety of works have underlined that the progressive flexibilization of the labor market in mature 
economies during the last three decades (Seccareccia, 1996; Stockhammer, 2011; Tridico, 2012, 2013; Brancaccio et 
al., 2018; Hein et al., 2020) substantially failed to favor employment recovery (Baccaro and Rei, 2007; Howell et al., 
2007; Adascalitei and Morano, 2015; Brancaccio et al., 2020). 
17 To further avoid cyclicality issues, in the empirical part of the paper we use also an additional definition of long-
term unemployment rate, as the ratio between  and the working-age population.  
18 This exercise is not intended to argue that long-term unemployed do not suffer from a worse condition than the 
short-term unemployed. In this regard, Ochsen and Welsch (2011) documented an association between the duration 
of unemployment and its social costs. Our intent is simply to provide evidence against their lower employability, as 
advocated by a variety of contributions reported in Section 2.1, and to support the view that their status is not worsened 
in recent times. 
Figure 2. Unemployment and long-term unemployment 
 
The two lines identify the dynamics of the unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment 
rate (average values for 25 OECD countries). Correlation is 0.94 in levels and 0.78 in first 
differences. 
 
In essence, this preliminary evidence suggests that when the overall unemployment rate falls, its 
long-term component also decreases. A closer look at the period between 1993 and 2008 indicates 
that the unemployment rate started its downswing one year before the : in 1993, the 
 peaked at approximately 9%, while in 2008 it was 5.6% (the lowest value of the series). 
In parallel, the  peaked one year after the peak of the  and then tracked this latter 
almost perfectly (with a lowest value of 2.6% in 2008). 
The synchrony of total and long-term unemployment rates is confirmed at the country level as well 
for almost all the countries included in our panel, as depicted in Figure A3.1 (reported in Appendix 
3 for reasons of space).19 
To further assess the relationship between the  and the  we also examine the 
dynamic patterns for the OECD aggregate and for some selected countries. Figure 3 plots the 
average trend for the 25 mature economies considered in this work. Remarkably, we can appreciate 
the existence of some loops from this two-axis representation. According to the NK explanation 
 
19 Of course, some discrepancies among countries exist in terms of levels of both variables. Essentially, these may 
depend on different macroeconomic trends, as well as on institutional and demographic patterns. While interesting 
and important for policy advice, this is, however, outside the scope of the present research, which is intended to 
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of hysteresis, due to the structural feature of long-term unemployment, we should expect a 
clockwise movement between the two variables: when the  falls, the  should 
remain elevated. On the contrary, in Figure 3, by connecting consecutive dots (each one 
representing one year from 1983 to 2016), a counterclockwise movement emerges. The takeaway 
message of this scatter plot is therefore quite clear: when one variable increases, the other increases 
too (and vice versa).20 As a paramount example, between 1983 and 1987, the average  
increased about 1 percent point (from approximately 7.3% to 8.2%), and the same happened with 
the  (from approximately 4% to 5.1%). In the subsequent period, while the  fell 
to 7% (in 1991), the  collapsed to 3.7%. More recently, after the Great Crisis, the  
started to increase (from 5.6% up to 9.2% in 2013). Meanwhile, the  presented the same 
pattern, rising from 2.6% in 2008 to 5.4% in 2013. When the recovery partially occurred, we 
observe a downswing in the , along with a fall in the : in 2016, they settled at 
7.4% and 4.2%, respectively. 
Some country-specific cases confirm the general tendency for OECD economies: the cases of 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States are depicted in Figure 
A3.2 (Appendix 3). Quite interesting is what has happened in the post-Great Crisis period:  the 
case of the United States is emblematic, where we observe a sharp increase in both variables from 
2008 to 2009. In the subsequent years, the data may lead to the aforementioned ‘long-term 
unemployment trap’ (Webster, 2005). In fact, from 2009 to 2010, at the very beginning of 
recovery, while the unemployment rate was virtually unchanged (from 9.3% to 9.6%), the 
 shows a sizeable increase (from 2.9% to 4.2%). When the recovery intensified, 
however, the two rates started to co-move again: from 2010 to 2016, the  decreased by four 
percentage points, and similarly the  decreased (from 4.2% to 1.2%). The sharp 
reabsorption of long-term unemployment observed in the United States is less evident in some 
European countries, such as Italy and Spain, due to the slower (or even null) recovery after the 
Great Recession and the ensuing persistence of high levels of unemployment, which produced an 
increasing stock of long-term unemployed people. Nevertheless, the direction of the relationship 
is generally confirmed, and this leads us to consider the macroeconomic outlook as likely to affect 
both the  and the  in a very similar way. 
As we have seen that the  tracks the dynamics of the  with some lags, we also 
find it useful to linger on the possible relationship between past levels of the unemployment rate 
and current levels of the long-term unemployment rate. To this purpose, Figure 4 represents the 
relationship between the lagged  and the current  for the whole panel under 
scrutiny (pooled data). Intuitively, a positive correlation is confirmed at various levels of 
unemployment, and no signal of non-linearity is observed for higher unemployment rates. This 
appears to be inconsistent with the NK framework outlined above, as reabsorbing higher pools of 
long-term unemployed people is supposed to be even more problematic (Duell et al., 2016; Mathy, 
2016). Nevertheless, evidence indicates that in correspondence with the lowest rates of total 
unemployment, the correlation between the  and the lagged  is less intense. The 
two different slopes drawn in the figure suggest that when unemployment is very low (below 4%, 
 
20 The work by Webster (2005) suggests that even the use of the long-term unemployment incidence (instead of the 
rate) would not produce the clockwise loops, testifying an inverse relationship between total and long-term 
unemployment, in case variables are considered with an appropriate delay. 
which may be taken to represent frictional unemployment), people who have been without a job 
for long spells actually are, or are expected to be, more likely to have some individual 
characteristics that make them less employable. Put differently, this evidence suggests that when 
the labor market is tight, it becomes convenient for employers to use the individual unemployment 
spell as a signal of unobserved characteristics, as discussed in Section 2.1. Accordingly, the long-
term unemployment stigma (Machin and Manning, 1999; Krug et al., 2019) seems to be at work 
mostly in the case of a tight labor market (Steffes and Biewev, 2008; Kroft et al., 2013; Shi et al., 
2018). 
Figure 4. Unemployment and long-term unemployment rates in OECD countries 
 
The regression coefficient (pooled data, 25 countries, 1983–2017) is 0.42 for values of the 
unemployment rate lower than 4% (yellow line), while 0.80 for values of the unemployment rate 
higher than 4% (red line). Coefficients are 0.37 and 0.77 if we consider data as a panel. 
All in all, evidence we have provided so far casts doubt on the validity of the NK thesis of the non-
reversibility of long-term unemployment. On the contrary, our evidence suggests the existence of 
symmetrical dynamics between the unemployment rate and its long-term component during both 
phases of recession and recovery. This indicates that the evolution of both variables may be 
explained by the same factors (Rodriguez-Gil, 2018). Nor does our analysis support the view that 
there is more stickiness in the decrease in the long-term unemployment rate than in its increase. 
Finally, we find evidence confirming that the likelihood of firms screening workers on the basis 
of their unemployment spell is greater in the context of a tight labor market than in a slack one. 
While all these elements suggest that long-term unemployment should be considered a reversible 
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approach suggests. For this reason, the next section will focus on specific cases of long-term 
unemployment reductions and the subsequent inflation dynamics. 
 
4. The non-inflationary effect of long-term unemployment reductions 
In the previous section, we focused on the connection between the total and long-term 
unemployment rates. After having provided some descriptive evidence suggesting that the two 
indicators go hand in hand, we concluded that decreasing unemployment is generally associated 
with reductions in the . Nonetheless, an additional step is needed to assess the NK 
explanation of hysteresis: we are interested in verifying whether sizeable reductions in long-term 
unemployment are likely to generate significant inflationary pressures. If not, it will provide 
further support for the need to reconsider the NK hysteresis models introduced in Section 2. Thus, 
in this section, we undertake an econometric analysis that will try to deal with the following issue: 
what happens to the pace of inflation during and after a sizeable reduction in long-term 
unemployment? To the best of our knowledge, no empirical works have addressed this issue yet. 
For this reason, it represents a focus of and major challenge for our investigation. 
4.1 Estimation strategy 
 
4.1.1 Data and methodology 
Before turning to the econometric estimations, let us describe the approach we will follow in our 
inquiry. To assess the effect of reductions in long-term unemployment on inflation, we make use 
of yearly data provided by the OECD and AMECO. According to data availability, we focus on 
25 advanced economies for the period 1983–2016. A detailed list of countries in our sample can 
be found in Appendix 4. Notably, the selection of countries is also in line with the current literature 
on hysteresis, which principally involves mature economies (Ball, 2009, 2014; Blanchard et al., 
2015; Girardi et al., 2020). 
 
As explained in Section 3, we will focus on the long-term unemployment rate (and its dynamics), 
and we consider the long-term unemployed as individuals who have been looking for work for at 
least six months. We first calculate the  as defined in Equation (6). Subsequently, for 
each country ( ), we calculate the annual percentage change in the . Significantly, we do 
not use its first differences, and we do so in order to take into account the intensity of the variation: 
the intuition behind this choice is that a one-point reduction in the level of the  may have 
different impacts on macroeconomic outcomes, such as inflation, depending on whether it occurs 
when a relatively high or low level of the  prevails. For this reason, we prefer to use the 
percentage rate of change in the long-term unemployment rate, as in Equation (7): 
       (7). 
 
As a second step, we introduce an identification strategy to define episodes of ‘sharp’ or ‘sustained’ 
reductions in the long-term unemployment rate. The rationale behind this approach is to assess the 
effect on inflation of sharp decreases in the  compared to cases where such a 
circumstance did not occur. Our findings will therefore represent the magnitude of inflationary 
surges experienced by ‘treated’ units (country-years with a strong decrease in the ) with 
respect to ‘control’ units (country-years without such a decrease). 
To detect strong reductions in long-term unemployment, we focus on negative values of the 
 exclusively, and we calculate the country average ( ) as well as the standard 
deviation ( ). Therefore, we identify an  reduction as a strong one when the observation 
for country  at time  satisfies the following criteria (C1 and C2): 
 
     (C1) 
with 
<0          (C2). 
 
Consistent with our approach, these selected episodes represent our treatment group, while 
observations not satisfying these criteria will belong to the control group. To directly identify the 
observations according to our yardstick, we built a dummy variable ( ) which assumes the value 
of 1 during an episode of sustained long-term unemployment reduction (that is, in case of a shock) 
and 0 otherwise. This ‘average treatment effect’ methodology is at the core of our investigation 
and offers valuable insights into our research question: we are interested in assessing whether sharp 
episodes of  reductions (the treated group) are, on average, associated with higher 
inflation than country-years in which this sharp reduction does not occur (the control group), after 
controlling for country and time fixed effects. 
In our sample, we detect 430 country-year observations featuring a decreasing long-term 
unemployment rate (that is, by ). By following our identification strategy, we 
isolate 78 cases of sharp long-term unemployment reduction and 721 non-episodes. Importantly, 
the control group is composed of both observations characterized by an increase in the  
(369) and observations that present a ‘moderate’ reduction (352). In Appendix 4, we indicate how 
episodes of long-term unemployment reductions are distributed among countries, while in 
Appendix 5, the complete list of episodes is reported. 
 
4.1.2 Size of the treatment 
As a second step, we aim at assessing whether the sample of treated is adequately representative 
of the treatment received, that is, if the selected episodes can effectively identify sizeable 
reductions in the  compared with the control group. To prove this, we use alternative 
empirical techniques. At first, by employing a standard t-statistics test, we aim at verifying whether 
the difference between the average values of considered variables are statistically significant 
between the two groups. Furthermore, to validate the representativeness of the treated sample, we 
also employ linear regression techniques by estimating the following Equation (8): 
 
       (8) 
 
where the dependent variable is the rate of change of the long-term unemployment rate;  is the 
dummy variable of identified episodes;  represents country-specific fixed-effects;  identifies 
year dummies; and  is the error term. When the coefficient  is found to be significant, a 
statistically significant difference between treated and control groups exists. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of tests on the size of the treatment. The average percentage change in 
the long-term unemployment rate ( ) settles at +9% in the control group, while it is  
-27% in the treated one. When implementing a mean comparison, the difference between treated 
and controls is highly statistically significant. Differences are confirmed in all specifications when 
we extend the analysis to regression-based techniques. In particular, we first estimate the relation 
without controls (‘GLS’ column); second, we estimate a fixed-effects model that only controls for 
country-specific effects (‘Country FE’); and finally, we run a two-way fixed-effects model that 
controls for a full set of country and year effects (‘Two-way FE’). The differences between the 
average values of the two samples are statistically significant in all specifications, and it is 
approximately equal to 30%.21 These findings confirm that the selected episodes are reliable and 
refer to sharp reductions in the long-term unemployment rate. We also provide evidence (see 
below) that the changes in long-term unemployment in the ‘treated’ determine a difference with 
respect to the control group that is not temporary, but lasts over the chosen five years window. 
 
21 For the sake of verifying whether such episodes occur independently (or not) on the magnitude of the long-term 
unemployment rate, we replicate the same analysis on the  taken in levels. Results (reported in Table 1) 
indicate that the level of the long-term unemployment rate is 4.16% in the control group while it is 2.86% in the treated 
group: this further testifies that a lower level of the  is generally reached after episodes of strong reductions. 
Table 1. Size of the treatment 
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The table reports the average decrease in long-term unemployment during episodes of reductions 
(relative to non-expansion observations). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of 
interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% difference). We employ a linear regression to 
compare the mean of the variable in the year of a ‘strong’ reduction of the long-term 
unemployment rate with the mean in the rest of the sample. The test is applied using three models: 
a GLS which considers the panel structure of data (‘GLS’); a fixed-effects model that only controls 
for country-specific effects (‘Country FE’); and a two-way fixed-effects model which controls for 
a full set of country and year effects (‘Two-way FE’). Robust standard errors clustered by country 
in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.1.3 Endogeneity issues 
A problem, however, might undermine our identification strategy: episodes of long-term 
unemployment reduction (that is, our shocks) may present a certain degree of endogeneity perhaps 
caused by changes in variables that also have an impact on (or reflect changes in) our dependent 
variable, that is, the inflation rate. For example, the long-term unemployment rate may be supposed 
to decrease in connection with sizeable surges in output, an element that may – other things being 
equal – stimulate the pace of inflation because of bottlenecks in capacity (fixed capital) rather than 
in the labor market. Alternatively, inflationary surges (or reductions) may be affected by the 
dynamics of the real effective exchange rate (or productivity), which in turn could produce effects 
on the levels of output and unemployment as well. In addition, movements in the policy interest 
rate might influence unemployment and at the same time result from pre-existing price dynamics, 
since in setting it, the monetary authority usually takes into account the pace of inflation (as 
discussed in Section 2.2). 
To assess the nature and extent of endogeneity, we look at differences in initial conditions: in 
particular, we verify whether  shocks are likely to be randomly assigned. In doing so, 
we focus on what happened the year before each treatment, and particularly, we verify whether 
relevant discrepancies between treated and non-treated observations hold with respect to a range 
of macroeconomic indicators. Put another way, we look at potential differences in economic 
preconditions in order to establish whether our shocks can be considered sufficiently exogenous 
for the purpose of studying the evolution of the inflation rate during and after the shocks. To do 
so, similar to what has been done in Equation (8), we apply a linear regression by considering each 
macroeconomic variable in the year before the shock ( ) as our endogenous variable, and as 
our exogenous variable the dummy variable including the shocks. We are interested in the 
coefficient , whose statistical significance would indicate differences between the average values 
of each selected macroeconomic indicator between episodes and non-episodes in the year 
preceding the shock. Formally, we estimate the following regression (Equation 9): 
        (9) 
where  represents the macroeconomic variable of interest;  is the dummy variable already 
introduced; and  are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Table 2 reports the results 
of the linear regressions undertaken to compare the mean of each variable in the year before the 
shock with the mean in the rest of the sample. The first column refers to a GLS regression in which 
we do not control for country and year fixed effects (thus assuming  =  for all countries and 
 = 0 for all years). Then, in the second column, we allow for country (but not year) fixed effects  
(  = 0 is still assumed for all t). Finally, in the third column, we include a full set of country and 
year fixed effects. Importantly, in our framework, this latter test represents the strongest way to 
control for potential endogeneity since it allows for the comparison of treated and non-treated 
countries within each year. After controlling for country-time fixed effects, endogeneity virtually 
disappears for a number of macroeconomic preconditions. Nevertheless, some discrepancies 
between treated and controls remain with respect to some variables. Specifically, coefficients on 
GDP growth, on the change in the unemployment rate and on short-term unemployment (both the 
rate and its incidence) are significant. Finally, we also detect a statistically significant difference 
for what concerns the inflation rate, our variable of interest, which turns out to be somewhat higher 
(0.8%) in the control group than in the treated, an element which suggests the need to control for 
the pre-existing trend in inflation in our estimations. 
Table 2. Comparison of lagged macroeconomic conditions in treated and non-treated 
observations  
Difference (treated – controls) 
Variable GLS Country FE 
Two-way 
FE 
Real GDP growth 
1.99*** 2.01*** 1.12*** 
(0.29) (0.20) (0.23) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.49 -0.50* -0.29 
(0.32) (0.26) (0.26) 
Unemployment rate (first difference) 
-0.94*** -0.93*** -0.71*** 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Labor productivity growth 
0.49** 0.51** 0.24 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) 
Real effective exchange rate (% change) 
-0.46 -0.41 -0.11 
(0.62) (0.72) (0.69) 
Long-term unemployment rate 
-0.13 -0.13 -0.07 
(0.26) (0.19) (0.19) 
Short-term unemployment rate 
-0.36*** -0.36*** -0.21** 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Short-term unemployment rate (first difference) 
-0.33*** -0.33*** -0.24*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Short-term unemployment incidence 
-4.2*** -4.2*** -4.4*** 
(1.03) (0.88) (0.82) 
Participation rate (15-64 years) 
-0.23 -0.24 0.04 
(0.46) (0.50) (0.34) 
Long-term interest rate 
0.26 0.25 0.01 
(0.42) (0.47) (0.30) 
Inflation rate 
-0.80* -0.79* -0.84** 
(0.43) (0.44) (0.37) 
For each variable, we employ a linear regression to compare the mean of the variable in the year 
before a ‘sustained’ long-term unemployment reduction with the mean in the rest of the sample 
(Equation 9). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The test is applied using 
three models: a GLS which considers the panel structure of data (‘GLS’); a fixed-effects model 
that only controls for country-specific effects (‘Country FE’); and a two-way fixed-effects model 
which controls for a full set of country and year effects (‘Two-way FE’). Robust standard errors 
clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The statistical significance of some macroeconomic preconditions merits explicit discussion. 
Unsurprisingly, estimates indicate that lagged GDP growth is associated with long-term 
unemployment reductions. Moreover, the coefficient of the lagged change in the unemployment 
rate is negative: this could be interpreted as an additional signal of a quasilinear association 
between the dynamic of total and long-term unemployment, as discussed in Section 3. In other 
words, this precondition further testifies that episodes of strong long-term unemployment 
reduction are likely to happen in the context of decreasing unemployment rates. We also find a 
negative and significant coefficient associated with short-term unemployment: this indicates that 
episodes of sustained decreases in the  
  are associated, on average, with lower short-term unemployment as well. Yet, this 
precondition would produce even more acceleration in the pace of inflation, according to the NK 
theory of hysteresis (Llaudes, 2005). For this reason, this initial condition would eventually 
strengthen our result if we do not find any signal of inflationary pressures during and after our 
shocks. 
All in all, preconditions indicate that our episodes tend to occur, on average, in a macroeconomic 
context that is more likely to generate inflation, that is, one featuring growing income, decreasing 
unemployment and lower short-term unemployment. Therefore, if no signal of inflation surges is 
detected, our analysis will be reinforced by these contextual conditions. However, to overcome as 
much as possible endogeneity issues in our estimations, we will explicitly control for all the 
macroeconomic preconditions that turned out to be significantly different in our episodes of strong 
long-term unemployment reduction vis à vis the control group: practically, we will insert these 
(lagged) variables as additional regressors, with a view to controlling for the pre-treatment trends 
of these variables (cf. Girardi et al., 2020). Furthermore, it has to be recalled that in all our estimates 
we will make use of time- (in addition to country-) fixed effects: being our dependent variable 
taken in annual changes, this strategy will further mitigate the endogeneity bias, if any, inasmuch 
year dummies would capture the presence of potential omitted variables which would 
simultaneously affect both inflation and LTU shocks. 
4.1.4 Model specification 
Having identified episodes of strong reductions in the , and after having dealt with 
potential endogeneity challenges, we now turn to the model specification. Of particular interest for 
the sake of our purposes is the approach suggested by Jordà (2005) and recently reappraised by a 
variety of works (see, among them, Teulings and Zubanov, 2014; Girardi et al., 2020). This method 
is commonly termed local projections (henceforth, LPs). In particular, it allows us to assess the 
average treatment effect of strong decreases in long-term unemployment on inflation. As we are 
wishing to evaluate the effect of our shocks on inflation at different time horizons, LPs are 
particularly appealing. Specifically, through this scheme, we will estimate the average behavior of 
inflation in the five-year period which follows the shocks by means of impulse response functions 
(henceforth, IRFs) and compare it to what happens in non-episode observations. Formally, the 
dynamic model we estimate is represented by the following Equation (10): 
 
     (10) 
with  = 0,…, 5 and where 
•  is the inflation rate at different points in time (from  to , with  identifying the 
year when the shock occurs); 
•  is the inflation rate in the year before each shock; 
•  is the dummy variable identifying shocks (and assuming the value of 1 in the case of a 
shock); 
•  is the vector of control variables, jointly or alternatively considered, that turned out 
to be relevant as initial conditions; 
•  and  identify country and year fixed effects, respectively; and 
•  denotes the error term. 
 
As suggested in Section 4.1.3, a two-way fixed-effect specification is preferable since it avoids 
endogeneity with respect to many preconditions. Moreover, this specification helps us in taking 
into account the heterogeneity among countries and in comparing the response to our shocks in 
different countries within each year. Finally, since our sample is composed of different economies 
that are considered for a relatively long time span, this approach presents a number of advantages 
with respect to a standard VAR-based model: our strategy for the estimation of IRFs is more 
flexible than a VAR as LPs allow a semi-parametric estimation of the ‘average treatment effect’ 
of long-term unemployment reductions at different time horizons, without assuming any 
underlying parametric model for the outcome variable (Girardi et al., 2020). As this approach 
imposes little structure on the data, it turns out to be particularly appealing in our setting. On the 
contrary, with a VAR or dynamic panel estimations, we would impose a single parametric model: 
for this reason, these models would be extremely sensitive to mis-specification of the data-
generating process, and this sensitivity becomes more important as the time horizon increases. 
Notably, LPs are instead robust to mis-specification of the data-generating process and thus have 
been recently used for the assessment of medium-run effects of negative macroeconomic shocks 
(Teulings and Zubanov, 2014). 
According to our estimation plan, when presenting and discussing our findings (Sections 4.2 and 
4.3), we will focus on the size and significance of : indeed, this coefficient represents the effect 
at the year  of an episode of sharp long-term unemployment reduction occurring in the year 
, a coefficient which will be plotted by means of our IRFs. Through the assessment of this 
coefficient, we aim at evaluating the average effect of a negative shock in the  at 




In our baseline estimations, we will focus on the effect of sharp long-term unemployment reduction 
on the inflation rate measured as the annual percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI). 
Importantly, in all our estimations, we do control for the pre-existing trend in inflation (that is, by 
including the lagged inflation rate in all specifications) because it is standard in the framework of 
LPs (Jordà, 2005). Our findings are depicted in Figure 5 and reported in Table 3. Model 1 is the 
baseline model to which we do not add additional controls, while in Models 2 to 5, we include as 
controls the variables that have been found to potentially cause a selection bias. Specifically: in 
Model 2, we control for the lagged change in the short-term unemployment rate; in Model 3, we 
include the lagged variation of the unemployment rate; in Model 4, we control for the lagged 
incidence of short-term unemployment; and finally, Model 5 simultaneously includes the two 
control variables considered in Models 3 and 4. 
 
As far as the very baseline model is concerned, findings indicate that sustained decreases in long-
term unemployment have very moderate effects on CPI-inflation: while at the onset the effect is 
virtually null, it becomes positive and statistically significant (at the 95% level) one year after the 
shock, although it is very low in size. On average, in treated observations, the inflationary pressure 
peaks two years after the shock (0.66 percentage points more than the control group) and then 
starts decreasing, to the point that it becomes null at time , pictured as an ‘inverted-U’. This 
pattern indicates that there is no trace of accelerating or even persistent inflation phenomena as the 
NK approach would predict after a severe reduction in the long-term component of unemployment.  
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The graphs display the IRFs of a strong 
reduction in the long-term unemployment rate 
on the inflation rate. They are obtained through 
local projections, controlling for a full set of 
country and year fixed effects and one lag of the 
inflation rate. In Model 1 we do not include 
additional controls. In Model 2 we control for 
the lagged change of short-term unemployment 
rate. In Model 3 we include the lagged variation 
of the unemployment rate. In Model 4 we 
control for the lagged incidence of short-term 
unemployment. Model 5 combines Models 3 and 
4. Years relative to the LTU reduction on the 
horizontal axis. Coefficients are reported in 
Table 3. Percentage points on the vertical axis. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country. 
 
When adding some control variables, inflation surges almost totally disappear. In detail, when we 
control for the lagged change in unemployment rate (Models 3 and 5), no statistically significant 
discrepancies in terms of inflation are detected between the treated and the control group: contrary 
to what is postulated by the NK explanation of hysteresis, we find lower inflation instead in treated 
units than in the control group 5 years after the shock. Models 2 and 4 also incorporate lagged 
short-term unemployment, considered in terms of both its rate and incidence, respectively. In 
addition, in these cases, the response of inflation is null on impact. Inflation surges become 
moderately positive and statistically significant from  to  (peaking in  at 0.55 and 
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Table 3. Dynamic effect of a long-term unemployment reduction on CPI-based inflation rate 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Model 1 0.18 0.50** 0.66** 0.49** 0.03 -0.17 
 (0.14) (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.17) (0.18) 
Model 2 0.18 0.42* 0.55** 0.39* -0.04 -0.22 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.25) (0.20) (0.17) (0.19) 
Model 3 -0.06 0.20 0.36 0.24 -0.22 -0.39** 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.24) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) 
Model 4 0.21 0.53** 0.67** 0.47** 0.01 -0.22 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.25) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) 
Model 5 -0.01 0.26 0.38 0.23 -0.25 -0.41** 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.24) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) 
Observations 799 774 749 724 699 674 
Episodes 78 74 72 69 69 69 
Effects estimated through local projections (see Equation 10). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 
for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). All 
regressions control for a full set of country and year fixed effects and for one (pre-treatment) lag 
of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Our results are validated by the fact that the identified shocks produce persistent effects on long-
term unemployment itself. As it can be seen in Appendix 6, in year  the  in the treated 
group is approximately 1 percent point below the control group, and subsequently it remains at 
lower level; at  we witness a negative peak in this gap (about -1.2 p.p., statistically significant 
at the 95% level). This clarifies that episodes constitute, on average, persistent decreases in the 
 relative to the control group. Moreover, it confirms that the non-inflationary effects of 
sharp reductions in long-term unemployment do not depend on a sudden reabsorption of the shock. 
All in all, evidence we provide does not confirm the existence of a sizeable inflationary risk 
associated with a sustained decrease in long-term unemployment, even when we control for initial 
macroeconomic conditions. Our findings are therefore at first glance in stark contrast to the NK 
narration of hysteresis based on the role of the long-term unemployed. Our episodes of sharp 
reductions in the long-term unemployment rate turned out to be associated with very small, short-
lived and in most cases statistically insignificant effects on inflation, with no sign of acceleration: 
in the ‘worst’ performing specification, inflation in the treated group peaks at about 0.6 percentage 
points more than the control group two years after the shock. 
 
However, the hysteresis models under scrutiny – as well as the standard NK models – predict that 
reductions in unemployment would be inflationary when the economy is already at potential output 
level (with the latter taking into account, when measured correctly according to these models, the 
structural nature of long-term unemployment). A first consideration in this regard is that, according 
to these models, economies tend to be at, or close to, their potential GDP, since the latter is 
regarded as an ‘attractor’ for the economic system. Therefore, our results concerning the absence, 
on average, of inflationary surges do indeed already cast considerable doubt on the explanation of 
hysteresis we are discussing, since they should be interpreted as occurring, on average, in 
economies that are close to their potential output. Yet, a counter-argument to our analysis could 
be raised by arguing that our  shocks would not produce inflationary pressures, 
according to the model, if they take place when the economy is below its potential (that is, when 
the actual unemployment rate is higher than the NAIRU). To deal with this possible criticism, we 
verify the size of the unemployment gap by considering the OECD estimates of the NAIRU. 
Remarkably, we find that 58 out of 78 episodes of sharp reductions in the long-term unemployment 
rate occurred in a country-year featuring a negative unemployment gap, that is, in a context where 
the economy stands above its (alleged) potential. According to NK hysteresis models, this situation 
is likely to be associated with accelerating inflation, so that our episodes would further contribute 
to price inflation. To check this, we test our model by considering only the subset of 58 shocks 
that occurred when there was a negative unemployment gap, and we verify the effects on inflation 
in four alternative specifications. Results are depicted in Figure 6 and reported in Table 4. 
 
The only specification producing statistically significant inflationary surges is the one represented 
by Model 6, in which we do not include control variables. Here, inflation turns out to be about 
0.75 percentage points higher in treated units than in the control group at , while the 
discrepancy is virtually null at the beginning and at the end of the 5-year window after the shock. 
When introducing our set of controls, the estimated treatment effect is almost equal to 0 in all 
specifications (Models 7 to 9). 
 
Figure 6. Effect of a long-term unemployment reduction on inflation rate (robustness to a 
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The graphs display the IRFs of a strong reduction in the long-term unemployment rate on the 
inflation rate when the shock occurs in case of negative unemployment gap (that is, with the 
NAIRU higher than the actual unemployment rate). They are obtained through local projections, 
controlling for a full set of country and year fixed effects, as well as for one lag of the inflation 
rate. In Model 6 we do not include additional controls. In Model 7 we also include the lagged 
growth rate of real GDP. In Model 8 we include the lagged growth rate of real GDP and the 
lagged change of short-term unemployment rate. In Model 9 we include the lagged real GDP 
growth rate, the lagged incidence of short-term unemployment and the lagged change in the 
unemployment rate. Coefficients are reported in Table 4. Years relative to the LTU reduction on 
the horizontal axis. Percentage points on the vertical axis. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country. 
 
Table 4. Dynamic effect of a long-term unemployment reduction on CPI-based inflation rate 
(occurring in case of negative unemployment gap) 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Model 6 0.13 0.53* 0.74** 0.54** -0.16 -0.36 
 (0.16) (0.30) (0.31) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26) 
Model 7 -0.04 0.22 0.50 0.36 -0.30 -0.44* 
 (0.16) (0.28) (0.30) (0.24) (0.22) (0.25) 
Model 8 -0.12 0.10 0.37 0.27 -0.38* -0.54** 
 (0.15) (0.27) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21) (0.25) 
Model 9 -0.10 0.16 0.37 0.23 -0.44** -0.59** 
 (0.15) (0.26) (0.28) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) 
Observations 779 754 730 705 680 655 
Episodes 58 54 53 50 50 50 
Effects estimated through local projections (see Equation 10). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 
for ease of interpretation. All regressions control for a full set of country and year fixed effects 
and for one (pre-treatment) lag of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.3 Robustness 
Some extensions of the specifications presented in Section 4.2 are needed to corroborate the 
relevance of our findings. In detail, our robustness tests involve both the regressors and the 
endogenous variable. Specifically, we extend our analysis in the following four directions. In 
Section 4.3.1, we add the lagged growth rate of GDP as an additional control variable. In Section 
4.3.2, we use a different scheme of shocks, where we take advantage of an alternative way to 
measure long-term unemployment in order to avoid potential bias stemming from the cyclical 
behavior of the labor force. In Section 4.3.3, we focus on the left-hand side of the equation as we 
consider two alternative measures of inflation to verify possible differences in the structure of 
prices. 
 
4.3.1 Controlling for the pre-existing trend in GDP 
As outlined in Section 4.1.3, our shocks are more likely to happen in a context of economic growth, 
an element which may itself be associated with inflation surges. This is not surprising from a 
Keynesian standpoint, as GDP growth is capable of reducing total unemployment, and this in turn, 
as evidenced in Section 3, is generally associated with a reduction in its long-term component. For 
this reason, in Models 10 to 12, we add the lagged growth rate of GDP as an additional control 
variable. The objective of this test is to verify whether inflationary pressures are more likely to 
occur when negative innovations in the  take place in a context of higher economic 
growth. Results are depicted in Figure 7 and reported in Table 5. When controlling for the pre-
existing trend in GDP, the paths of inflation during and after a negative  shock are quite 
similar to the one stemming from our baseline model but are not statistically significant even in 
comparison with its peak two years after the initial shock. 
 
Figure 7. Effect of a long-term unemployment reduction on inflation rate (robustness to the 













The graphs display the IRFs of a strong 
reduction in the long-term unemployment rate 
on the inflation rate. They are obtained 
through local projections, controlling for a full 
set of country and year fixed effects, as well as 
for one lag of the inflation rate and of the real 
GDP growth rate. In Model 10 we do not 
include additional controls. In Model 11 we 
include the lagged change of short-term 
unemployment rate. In Model 12 we include 
the lagged variation of the unemployment rate 
and the lagged incidence of short-term 
unemployment. Coefficients are reported in 
Table 5. Years relative to the LTU reduction on 
the horizontal axis. Percentage points on the 
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Table 5. Dynamic effect of a long-term unemployment reduction on CPI-based inflation rate 
(controlling for the pre-existing trend in real GDP) 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Model 10 0.01 0.19 0.41 0.30 -0.11 -0.25 
 (0.14) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.16) (0.17) 
Model 11 -0.10 0.06 0.26 0.20 -0.23 -0.39** 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.24) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) 
Model 12 -0.06 0.14 0.28 0.17 -0.29** -0.43** 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.23) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) 
Observations 772 747 722 697 672 647 
Episodes 78 74 72 69 69 69 
Effects estimated through local projections (see Equation 10). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 
for ease of interpretation. All regressions control for a full set of country and year fixed effects 
and for one (pre-treatment) lag of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.3.2 Alternative definition of long-term unemployment 
An additional issue in our inquiry may relate to the fact that the labor force, that is, the denominator 
of the , could itself present some elements of endogeneity with respect to general 
macroeconomic conditions. For example, the labor force tends to contract after a prolonged 
recession, as individuals seeking jobs may become frustrated and abandon the labor force 
(discouraged workers).22 To tackle this, using the working age population as the denominator may 
avoid cyclical bias and contribute to isolating ‘pure’ shocks on long-term unemployment.23 
Accordingly, we apply the same criteria (C1 and C2), and we find 75 sustained negative shocks in 
the , now defined as the ratio between long-term unemployment and the population from 
15 to 64 years old. We then estimate the effects on inflation through LPs, whose patterns are 
depicted in 2.1 (Models A1 to A4) and reported in Table A7.1 (Appendix 7). Contrary to what 
happens with the standard definition of long-term unemployment, no statistically significant surges 
 
22 Fuchs and Weber (2017) provided empirical support to the ‘discouraged worker’ effect for Germany. Ozerkek 
(2013) provided a similar analysis for a panel of mature countries. 
23 Let us clarify that to avoid this issue in our empirical explorations, we make use of the long-term unemployment 
rate instead of the incidence, as deeply discussed in Section 3. Accordingly, this test has to be interpreted as an 
additional check against our reference model. 
in inflation are estimated at different time-horizons when using this measure in four alternative 
specifications. 
 
Figure 8. Robustness to alternative measures of long-term unemployment and inflation rate 
Figure 8.1. Effect of a long-term unemployment reduction calculated on active population (instead 
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The graphs display the IRFs of a strong reduction in the long-term unemployment rate on the 
inflation rate. They are obtained through local projections, controlling for a full set of country and 
year fixed effects, as well as for one lag of the inflation rate. In Models A1, A5 and A9 we only 
control for the lagged inflation rate. In Models A2, A6 and A10 we control for the lagged growth 
rate of real GDP. In Models A3, A7 and A11 we control for the lagged growth rate of real GDP 
and the lagged variation of short-term unemployment rate. In Models A4, A8 and A12 we control 
for the lagged growth rate of real GDP, the lagged short-term unemployment incidence, and the 
lagged variation of unemployment rate. Coefficients are reported in Appendix 7 (Tables A.7.1, 
A.7.2 and A.7.3, respectively). Years relative to the LTU reduction on the horizontal axis. 
Percentage points on the vertical axis. Robust standard errors clustered by country. 
4.3.3 Alternative measures of inflation 
We also check the robustness of our results by using alternative measures of inflation. Specifically, 
we make use of the rates of change in the GDP deflator and the rates of change in the index of 
export prices. This exercise is particularly interesting as it allows assessing price dynamics from 
different angles: normally, domestic consumption and GDP have different compositions (the 
former, for example, includes imported goods; the latter includes capital goods), and therefore 
inflation can be examined with respect to different commodity baskets and price structures. The 
results of this test are depicted in Figure 8.2 (Models A5 to A8) and Figure 8.3 (Models A9 to 
A12), and the relative coefficients are reported in Appendix 7; specifically, in Table A7.2, we 
report four specifications with respect to the effects on GDP deflator-based inflation, while in 
Table A7.3, the same specifications are estimated with respect to changes in export prices. No 
statistically significant effects on inflation are estimated during and after the shocks with respect 
to the control group in all specifications when using alternative measures of prices. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
 
Our paper provides empirical evidence questioning the implications of the explanation of 
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the validity of this class of models. On the one hand, we verified that the unemployment rate and 
its long-term component share similar paths over time, during periods of economic slack and, more 
importantly, during phases of decreasing unemployment. This undermines the irreversibility of 
long-term unemployment, which is central in the standard model of hysteresis, according to which 
such irreversibility would cause persistently higher actual rates of unemployment and a higher 
NAIRU. On the other hand, the evidence we provide is supportive of negligible effects in terms of 
inflation associated with episodes of strong reductions in long-term unemployment. Notably, this 
is also verified in cases of sharp reductions in the long-term unemployment rate which occurred in 
the context of a negative unemployment gap, that is, when the actual unemployment was below 
the estimated NAIRU. 
 
Our findings turn the spotlight on the policy implications of the hysteresis models under scrutiny, 
according to which the NAIRU should be reduced almost exclusively by means of structural 
reforms in the labor market, as has also been advocated by international institutions (OECD, 1994, 
2012; IMF, 2011; ECB, 2015). Indeed, by incorporating hysteresis, these models present two 
controversial implications which our findings call into question: on the one hand, it is advocated 
that monetary tightening (or a recession) may increase the NAIRU; on the other hand, once the 
NAIRU has increased, expansionary policies aimed at restoring previous levels of unemployment 
would turn out to be inflationary. On the contrary, according to our exploration, demand-side 
expansionary policies would be able to decrease both total and long-term unemployment, without 
generating accelerating inflation. This policy implication is clearly at variance with the 
conventional wisdom that aggregate demand only matters in the short run, as well as with the role 
of the NAIRU as an inflationary barrier, which is ultimately determined by supply-side factors 
(Stockhammer and Sturn, 2012). 
 
Quite encouraging, in this respect, is one of the conclusions reached by Ball (1999): even assuming 
that the long-term unemployed do not put pressure on wages, the author indicates that they can be 
re-employed if demand is sufficiently strong (p. 231). While supporting this statement, our work 
can be seen as a further step along the path taken by Ball: as large adverse shocks in long-term 
unemployment do not tend to increase the pace of inflation persistently, our findings pose some 
challenges for this class of NK models of hysteresis and support an alternative theory of 
distribution, inflation and hysteresis. 
 
Once we admit the possibility of extending the role of aggregate demand in determining output 
and employment in the long run, the path-dependence of potential income becomes quite a natural 
consequence.24 This path dependence could be explained by another source of hysteresis that can 
be found in the literature, that is, the role of aggregate demand in stimulating capital formation and 
productivity. Periods of prolonged underutilization of productive capacity could reduce investment 
and hence potential output. However, a sufficiently persistent higher-than-normal rate of capacity 
 
24 In this framework, the concept of potential output is not immediately intelligible. According to Serrano (2019), 
potential output (or capacity output) can be view as ‘determined by size and efficiency of the existing stock of capital 
equipment’ (p. 13) at some point in time. But such stock can be increased by additional investment stimulated by 
aggregate demand (Fontanari et al., 2020; Girardi et al., 2020). 
utilization would induce investment and hence contribute to restoring the normal utilization rate 
while increasing both actual and potential output (Serrano, 2019). 
 
Endorsing a pure conflict-claim explanation of inflation would imply that a decline in 
unemployment and its long-term component does not necessarily lead to an acceleration of the 
inflation rate, although some redistribution of income may occur.25 This allows us to consider, in 
line with our empirical results, the possibility of a ‘reverse’ or ‘positive’ hysteresis: what would 
happen in the case of demand-side expansionary policies is a level effect on output and hence on 
employment (Girardi et al., 2020) and, as our results suggest, a decline in both total and long-term 
unemployment. In this context, increased investment would contribute to the process of adjustment 
of capacity, while the acceleration of inflation would not generally occur, due to the increase in 
both actual and potential output, as long as there are available labor ‘reserves’ (Stirati, 2001; 
Serrano, 2019; Fontanari et al., 2020; Girardi et al., 2020). Finally, in this alternative perspective, 
the notion of ‘structural’ unemployment would also have a different connotation: indeed, it would 
refer to involuntary unemployment due to the lower-than-necessary speed of capital accumulation 
(to maintain full employment), with the latter mostly depending on the path of aggregate demand. 
  
 
25 Accelerating inflation, of course, does occasionally occur, but observation suggests this is a rather extreme 
phenomenon, possibly caused by very strong conflict over income distribution, most often fueled by external factors 
such as sharp increases in primary commodity prices and/or large exchange rate devaluations. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Data and sources 
 
Data Description and sources 
Unemployment rate 
Unemployment rate (as a percentage of active labor force). 
Source: OECD.Stat, Labor Force Statistics. 
Long-term unemployment rate 
(LTU rate) 
Author calculation based on long-term unemployment 
(persons, 6 months or more) and active labor force (15-64 
years). We also calculated LTU rate by dividing long-term 
unemployment by working age population (15-64 years). 
Source: OECD.Stat, Labor force statistics. 
Short-term unemployment rate 
(STU rate) 
Author calculation on short-term unemployment (persons, 
less than 6 months) and labor force (15-64 years). 
Source: OECD.Stat, Labor force statistics. 
Incidence of short-term 
unemployment 
(STU incidence) 
Author calculation on short-term unemployment (persons, 
less than 6 months) and unemployment. 
Source: OECD.Stat, Labor force statistics. 
Active labor force 
(active population) 
Active labor force comprises all persons who fulfil the 
requirements for inclusion among the employed (civilian 
employment plus the armed forces) or the unemployed. 
Source: OECD.Stat, Labor force statistics. 
Participation rate 
Active labor force as a percentage of working age 
population (15-64 years). 
Source: OECD.Stat, Labor force statistics. 
NAIRU 
Non-accelerating inflation (equilibrium) unemployment 
rate, as a percentage of active labor force. 
Source: OECD.Stat, Economic Outlook No 105, May ’19 
Inflation rate (CPI index) 
Annual percent change of CPI index. 
Source: OECD.Stat, Economic Outlook No 101, June ’17. 
Inflation rate (GDP deflator) 
Annual percent change of GDP deflator. 
Source: OECD.Stat, Economic Outlook No 101, June ’17. 
Inflation rate (export prices) 
Annual percentage change of the price level of exports. 
Source: Penn World Tables (version 9.1). 
Long-term interest rate 
According to OECD definition, long-term interest rates 
refer to government bonds maturing in ten years. 
Source: OECD.Stat, Main Economic indicators. 
Real GDP growth 
Annual percent change of gross domestic product, volume 
(market prices). 
Source: OECD.Stat, Economic Outlook No 101, June ’17. 
Labor productivity growth 
Annual percent change of gross domestic product per hours 
worked (in real terms). 
Source: OECD.Stat, GDP per capita and productivity 
levels.  
Real effective exchange rate 
(REER) 
Real effective exchange rate (constant trade weights). 
Source: OECD.Stat, Economic Outlook No 101, June ’17. 
 
Appendix 2. The relationship between the unemployment rate and the incidence of long-
term unemployment 
Figure A2.1. Current unemployment rate 
 
Correlation is 0.70 (significant at the 99% level). The adjusted R-squared of the regression is 
0.47. 
Figure A2.2. Lagged unemployment rate 
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Unemployment rate, lagged (OECD average)
Appendix 3. Long-term and total unemployment rates by country 
 





























































































































Each figure depicts the dynamic patterns of unemployment rate and its long-term component in 
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Appendix 4. Countries in our sample 
 
Country  






















       
Australia 23 4 34 38 10.13 6.26 
Austria 9 2 20 22 9.58 7.11 
Belgium 17 3 30 33 10.07 6.94 
Canada 24 6 34 40 11.40 6.22 
Czech Republic 11 2 21 23 13.22 9.05 
Denmark 22 5 28 33 13.91 10.21 
Finland 18 4 22 26 9.93 8.29 
France 14 2 39 41 7.88 5.20 
Germany 21 5 28 33 8.82 5.16 
Greece 15 3 30 33 5.80 4.19 
Hungary 13 2 22 24 10.95 8.15 
Iceland 16 1 24 25 24.42 13.61 
Ireland 18 2 30 32 15.43 11.91 
Italy 16 2 31 33 8.92 7.20 
Japan 19 4 35 39 9.81 5.46 
Luxembourg 15 3 30 33 20.04 18.07 
Netherlands 14 3 23 26 13.81 6.93 
Norway 14 2 32 34 28.15 26.36 
Poland 13 2 22 24 15.67 13.43 
Portugal 16 3 27 30 15.10 9.80 
Spain 19 3 27 30 12.25 8.88 
Sweden 22 5 37 42 13.52 9.84 
Switzerland 11 1 24 25 12.36 8.71 
United Kingdom 21 5 27 32 12.45 8.03 
United States 29 4 44 48 18.40 9.81 
       
Total 430 78 721 799 - - 
 
Episode of ‘strong’ reductions in the long-term unemployment rate have been identified as defined 
in Section 4.1. 
 


























Australia 1989 22.40 YES France 2001 19.41 YES Netherlands 2008 24.01 YES 
Australia 1995 20.23  France 2007 13.46 YES Norway 1985 61.81 YES 
Australia 1999 17.31  Germany 1990 14.26  Norway 1986 100.00 YES 
Australia 2007 19.76 YES Germany 2007 17.18  Poland 2007 35.49 YES 
Austria 2001 23.22 YES Germany 2008 17.33  Poland 2008 46.19 YES 
Austria 2008 18.58 YES Germany 2011 15.43 YES Portugal 1988 25.60  
Belgium 1989 19.80 YES Germany 2016 16.53 YES Portugal 1992 37.27 YES 
Belgium 1990 19.13 YES Greece 2001 10.33  Portugal 1998 30.33  
Belgium 2000 25.74 YES Greece 2007 14.88 YES Spain 1999 21.37  
Canada 1979 17.95 YES Greece 2008 11.34 YES Spain 2001 30.27 YES 
Canada 1988 24.46 YES Hungary 2014 25.23 YES Spain 2005 36.28 YES 
Canada 1995 18.20  Hungary 2016 25.78 YES Sweden 1974 27.57 YES 
Canada 1998 18.84 YES Iceland 2016 56.21 YES Sweden 1986 24.96 YES 
Canada 1999 18.64 YES Ireland 1999 45.45 YES Sweden 1988 31.20 YES 
Canada 2000 19.27 YES Ireland 2000 37.72 YES Sweden 2000 25.07 YES 
Czech 
Republic 2007 28.97 YES Italy 1992 25.56 YES Sweden 2001 23.65 YES 
Czech 
Republic 2016 27.65 YES Italy 2004 23.23 YES 
Switzerla
nd 2000 33.89 YES 
Denmark 1984 24.34  Japan 1980 20.35  United Kingdom 1988 24.13 YES 
Denmark 1986 36.74 YES Japan 1983 16.77  United Kingdom 1989 24.25 YES 
Denmark 1995 24.98  Japan 1989 18.99 YES United Kingdom 1998 24.24 YES 
Denmark 2006 30.74 YES Japan 2014 17.51 YES United Kingdom 2014 21.04 YES 
Denmark 2008 31.52 YES Luxembourg 1986 48.61  
United 
Kingdom 2015 22.53 YES 
Finland 1983 23.50  Luxembourg 1988 48.97  
United 
States 1973 40.92 YES 
Finland 1998 22.74 YES Luxembourg 1991 47.79 YES 
United 
States 1978 39.05 YES 
Finland 2001 18.62 YES Netherlands 1999 21.81 YES 
United 
States 1984 37.34  
Finland 2008 22.75 YES Netherlands 2007 24.98  
United 
States 2015 28.24  
The table reports the complete list of episodes (country-year) of strong reduction in the long-term 
unemployment rate, as defined in Section 4.1. The column Gap (-) identifies the cases in which the 
reductions occur in country-years with negative unemployment gap (that is, country-years in 
which the actual unemployment rate is lower than the NAIRU). 
Appendix 6. Average behavior of the long-term unemployment rate during and after a shock 
 
 
Impulse-response function for the effect of a strong percentage decrease in the long-term 
unemployment rate on the long-term unemployment rate itself. Obtained through local projections, 
controlling for a full set of country and year fixed effects and one lag of the dependent variable. 
Years relative to the LTU reduction on the horizontal axis. Percentage points (relative to the 
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Appendix 7. Robustness to alternative measures of long-term unemployment rate and 
inflation rate 
 
Table A7.1. Dynamic effect of a long-term unemployment reduction calculated on active 
population (instead that on labor force) on CPI-based inflation rate 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Model A1 0.18 0.51** 0.53* 0.36 -0.03 -0.18 
 (0.14) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.18) (0.20) 
Model A2 0.01 0.20 0.28 0.17 -0.16 -0.26 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.26) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) 
Model A3 -0.09 0.06 0.14 0.08 -0.26 -0.37* 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) 
Model A4 -0.05 0.15 0.16 0.04 -0.32* -0.41** 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.25) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) 
Observations 770 745 720 695 670 645 
Episodes 75 71 69 66 66 66 
 
 
Table A7.2. Dynamic effect of a long-term unemployment reduction on inflation rate measured on 
GDP deflator 
 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Model A5 0.19 0.42* 0.46 0.17 -0.01 -0.17 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.31) (0.19) (0.25) (0.28) 
Model A6 0.07 0.20 0.28 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.29) (0.19) (0.25) (0.28) 
Model A7 -0.03 0.01 0.15 -0.10 -0.16 -0.29 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.17) (0.25) (0.29) 
Model A8 -0.05 0.01 0.11 -0.17 -0.29 -0.40 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.27) (0.17) (0.26) (0.29) 
Observations 790 765 740 715 690 665 
Episodes 77 73 71 68 68 68 
 
 
Table A7.3. Dynamic effect of a long-term unemployment reduction on inflation rate measured on 
export prices 
 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Model A9 0.29 0.37 -0.22 0.12 0.84 -0.01 
 (0.36) (0.28) (0.27) (0.39) (0.55) (0.17) 
Model A10 0.16 0.46 -0.17 -0.05 0.90 0.00 
 (0.34) (0.28) (0.27) (0.38) (0.56) (0.18) 
Model A11 0.31 0.43 -0.18 0.01 0.89 0.04 
 (0.36) (0.26) (0.29) (0.41) (0.58) (0.20) 
Model A12 0.26 0.33 -0.20 0.11 0.85 0.10 
 (0.34) (0.26) (0.30) (0.40) (0.56) (0.21) 
Observations 790 765 740 715 690 665 
Episodes 77 73 71 68 68 68 
 
Effects estimated through local projections (see Equation 10 in the main text). Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Models are described in Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3, 
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
